Corruption, Liberalization and Democracy: Editorial Introduction by Harriss-White, Barbara & White, Gordon
Corruption has been a long-standing if intermittent
focus of concern in development circles for over
three decades. There has been an enormous
amount of theorizing and empirical research on the
phenomenon which has produced a bewildering
array of alternative explanations, typologies and
remedies based on intellectual approaches ranging
from macro-sociological analyses of socio-cultural
processes to dyadic game-theory modelling. While
this work is quantitatively impressive, it has not cul-
minated in a paradigm of analysis which is useful
both for understanding and for combating corrup-
tion. Indeed, the gradual accretion of research has
tended to make the issue seem ever more complex
and immune to comparative analysis while attempts
to simplify (as, for example, through the use of rent-
seeking or public choice theories) have proven
instruments too blunt to be intellectually cogent or
practically useful. As the World Bank admits in its
report on Governance and Development (1992:
16), the causes of corruption are rooted in the par-
ticular political and economic conditions of each
country and 'as such, its causes are as complex as
the types of corruption are varied'. In practical
terms, this complexity - and the resulting perplexity
- makes remedial efforts difficult. Moreover, while
corruption is part of the corridor and canteen con-
versations of development practitioners, the expedi-
encies of institutional diplomacy make it difficult to
tackle explicitly and directly, either as a target of
developmental action or as a criterion for develop-
ment assistance.
Why then raise corruption yet again as a subject for
serious attention? First, there is a widespread per-
ception that the level and pervasiveness of corrup-
tion is not only much greater than we thought it
was, but may well be increasing. Political and
bureaucratic corruption is still stubbornly
entrenched in the poor countries of sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia, remains an intrinsic element
of the developmentally successful East Asian NICS
(with the exception of Singapore), has reached the
very highest levels of political office in many Latin
American societies and has rapidly reached alarm-
ing proportions in the post-communist transitional
societies, notably in the former Soviet Union and
China. Ariel Cohen writes in the World Bank pub-
lication Transition (1995: 7) that 'a tidal wave of
corruption is sweeping Eurasia, threatening to bury
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other countries in the region', a tide which 'not only
threatens Russia but the entire world'. Moreover,
contrary to conventional wisdom, recent revelations
in Japan, Belgium, Italy, France, Spain and the
United Kingdom have shown that pervasive politi-
cal corruption can be an entrenched element of
highly industrialized, democratic societies, not an
unfortunate but ultimately escapable dimension of
underdevelopment or authoritarianism. Indeed,
from the perspective of the 'donor' countries in the
industrialized West and East, corruption is not only
more of a problem than ever 'out there' in the devel-
oping world, but it also an uncomfortable aspect of
their own situations.
Second, the waves of economic liberalization start-
ing in the eighties, the 'third wave' of democratiza-
tion in the post-Cold War 1990s and the 'good
governance' agenda which has emerged among the
major development agencies have brought renewed
hopes for an effective, root-and-branch cure for cor-
ruption. The spread of neo-liberal economics and
liberal-democratic politics has brought to the fore
certain basic assumptions and theses about the
causes and cure of corruption. On the economic
side, corruption has been identified as one of the
consequences of excessive state intervention and
the bureaucratic rents created thereby; on the polit-
ical side, it has been seen as a consequence of the
unaccountable monopoly power of various kinds of
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. The policy
implications of these analyses are that corruption
can be reduced by rolling back the state through
privatization and deregulation and by introducing
more competition, transparency and accountability
into the political process through a transition to a
liberal democratic regime. These broad arguments
seem plausible in broad theoretical terms, but
how accurate are they in reality? They need to be
subjected to empirical testing in the light of experi-
ence of economic liberalization and political
democratization over the last decade. In some
contexts, it would seem, (India and China, for
example), the amount of corruption has increased
along with and apparently as a result of economic
liberalization. Moreover, the democratization of
many erstwhile authoritarian regimes does not
seem to have made a significant impact on levels
of corruption (for example, in South Korea) and
may even have made things worse (for example,
the Philippines).
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Counter evidence of this nature raises a host of
questions about the precise nature of relationships
between corruption in its various forms on the one
side and economic liberalization and political
democratization on the other. Do the latter
processes contribute significantly to reducing the
incidence of corrupt practices? If so, why and, if
not, for what precise reasons and can anything be
done to remedy the situation in the short and
medium terms? Answers to these questions may be
helpful not only for any attempt specifically to inte-
grate anti-corruption measures into the governance
agenda of the development agencies, but also for
many citizens of newly democratic societies who are
struggling to combat corrupt practices as part of a
broader search for clean and responsible govern-
ment and social justice.
These questions can best be answered through a
combination of comparative analysis with analyti-
cally informed case studies of countries which have
recently been undergoing economic and political
transitions. Such form the majority of contribu-
tions to this Bulletin. In this Introduction we shall
briefly trace the findings of our contributors under
three headings: economic liberalization and corrup-
tion, democratization and corruption and the polit-
ical economy of corruption and anti-corruption.
(j) Economic liberalization and
corruption
The global comparative evidence marshalled by
Ades and di Tella suggests a clear, inverse relation-
ship between corruption one the one hand and
investment and indices of economic liberalization
such as the degree of domestic product market
competition and openness of economies on the
other. Evidence of processes of transition - which
may operate not merely in the short and medium
but also in the longer term - derived from our coun-
try case-studies suggests, however, that the relation-
ship is more complex and less-unidirectional.
Rather than reducing the incidence of corruption,
economic liberalization in certain contexts acts
rather to displace it, redefining the character of cor-
rupt relationships away from those initiated and
controlled by state actors to those initiated and con-
trolled by actors in civil society This 'privatization'
of corruption is documented by Tat Yan Kong in his
study of government-business relations in South
Korea and Gordon White in his study of post-Mao
economic reforms in China and is analysed by
Mushtaq Khan in terms of a shift in the balance of
power between patrimonial and clientelist forms of
corruption, the scale and distribution of which
depends both on the nature of the 'political settle-
ment' between state and society within which a spe-
cific process of economic liberalization takes place
and on the extent to which it is challenged and con-
tested. The overall level of corruption may be unaf-
fected: on the one hand, the supply of corrupt
opportunities from state officials (both bureaucratic
and political) remains high because the regulatory
responsibilities of the state in the new economic
system may still remain substantial while political
controls over the behaviour of state officials remain
weak. On the other hand, the demand for corrup-
tion remains high because economic influentials,
notably the new economic elites enriched and
empowered by the liberalization process, seek to
maintain and defend rents in the face of competi-
tors. The long-term remedy for this situation is to
attack both sources of supply and demand by trans-
forming the institutional behaviour of the state,
especially by strengthening its regulatory capacity,
and by institutionalizing the operations of markets
and the behaviour of market actors through both
exogenous (state) and endogenous (associational)
regulation. Without the latter 'clean-up' of the mar-
ket sphere, private corruption will act to weaken
state capacity in ways which threaten the entire
credibility and capacity of the public sphere, as
Harriss-White shows in her study of a South Indian
market town and Rathin Roy documents in his
study of the black economy in India and its impact
on the disposable fiscal surplus of the state. Mark
Hampton adds an international dimension to the
problem by drawing attention to the potential
impact of economic globalization on corruption,
arguing that the rapid growth in the international
circulation of 'furtive capital' through the growing
'offshore interface' of tax havens and offshore finan-
cial centres provides greater incentives for domestic
corruption by facilitating the covert laundering of
gains from corrupt transactions.
(ii) Democratization and corruption
Several of our contributors similarly provide evi-
dence to suggest that the relationship between cor-
ruption and democratization over the past decade
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has been contradictory Far from improving things
in the short and medium term, democratization
may actually increase the sources and scale of cor-
ruption without strengthening countervailing polit-
ical or institutional capacity As Gordon White
shows in the case of China and both Charles Jones
and Walter Little argue in the context of Latin
America, previous authoritarian regimes exercised
strict controls over corruption. In such cases a
mere change in the procedural regime makes things
worse by destroying these constraints without pro-
viding an alternative set. Moreover, as John Sidel
documents in the cases of Thailand and the
Philippines, even in countries where the previous
authoritarian regime was pervasively corrupt,
democratization has had the effect not of reducing
corruption but 'decentring' it from the central elite
of the ancien regime to local bosses able to select
their own national politicians and through them
control the bureaucracy While democratization
involves the spread of political and civil freedoms,
it can also open up an era of licence without
responsibility to the benefit of existing and emer-
gent economic and political elites. Democratic sys-
tems also provide incentives and opportunities for
corrupt behaviour, notably the enormous costs of
mounting election campaigns, the capture of politi-
cal parties by economic elites, the politicization of
the state apparatus by elected officials and the
desire of the latter to compensate for political
uncertainty by building up a capital stake through
corruption. However, our contributors tend to
agree that these phenomena are particularly strong
in fledgling democracies where a procedural transi-
tion has not been accompanied and underpinned
by a spread of 'real' or substantive democracy
While democratic institutions do open up a long-
term prospect of institutional remedies for corrup-
tion, these require a powerful political impetus to
make them work effectively This latter must await
the expansion of political power to currently
excluded majorities and the activation of constituen-
cies which suffer most from elite corruption, in-
cluding both middle and working class movements
and the political institutions which represent them.
(iii) The political economy of 'new
corruption' and anti-corruption
As the contributions to this Bulletin accumulated,
the editors read them with a growing sense of
alarm. Rather than witnessing a trend from the
bad days of the 'old corruption' of economic
dirigisme and political authoritarianism to a new
dawn of economic competition and political
accountability, we discovered the rise of a 'new
corruption', rooted in the logic of economic and
political liberalization, reflecting the activity of
rapacious local elites no longer subject to the
domestic and international constraints of the Cold
War era and increasingly pervaded by criminal or
'mafioso' forces. It might of course be said that
these are mere transitional teething problems. In
the long run, since competitive markets will
destroy the basis of rent-seeking and democratic
institutions will create the political constraints
necessary to enforce accountability, corruption will
wither away Historically speaking, however,
this took a very long time in the currently industri-
alized countries and corruption is far from wither-
ing away there. Moreover, there are fundamental
processes currently at work which make this sce-
nario seem utopian. Domestic and international
liberalization - by undermining the political credi-
bility and regulatory capacities of many states- has
contributed to a more generalized process of
political decay This reduces the incentives for
probity on the part of officials and politicians, and
creates a widespread social alienation from the
political process. In turn this alienation reduces the
possibility of strong political movements emerging
to wage war on corruption.
Does this mean that action to reduce corruption
in the here and now is impossible, a prospect which
is distasteful to professionals in the 'can-do' world
of development? As Mushtaq Khan and Barbara
Harriss-White argue forcefully, we can begin by
improving our understanding of the phenomenon
by going beyond the currently dominant economic
analyses (notably rent-seeking theory) and seeking
to integrate their insights within a broader frame-
work of political economy which situates corrupt
transactions within the context of challenges to
specific 'political settlements'. The identification
of corruption also needs to extend beyond its
traditional focus on the state to a wider considera-
tion of both state and civil society since, as several
of our contributors argue, the impact of liberaliza-
tion is to displace the pu mum mobile of corruption
from the state into the market sphere.
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As for practical measures, the situation at first
glimpse looks bleak because our case-studies show
that there can be a huge array of anti-corruption
institutions, regulations and laws available in a
given society (Venezuela, for example), but not
worth the paper they are written on without the
political impetus to make them effective. In the
recent past, there have been few success-stories in
combating corruption. There are cases where a
hegemonic political institution has been able to
impose effective constraints (the usual example is
the People's Action Party in Singapore), but these
seem rare and Singapore is very special (as is Hong
Kong which is also often cited as a success). If we
are interested in effective as opposed to declaratory
measures, we need to understand the forces and
motives underlying the politics of anti-corruption.
Comparative experience of anti-corruption 'clean-
ups' within authoritarian systems suggests that, to
be effective, they need to rank high on the national
political agenda and the political leadership must be
'committed' to them. But how can both these polit-
ical conditions be achieved in the context of demo-
cratic polities?
Both economic liberalization and democratization
can liberate political resources and opportunities
for combating corruption. They can free up power
monopolies in society and reduce the feasibility of
corrupt behaviour through greater openness and
competition. Tat Yan Kong's study of South Korea
shows how democratization can open up these pos-
sibilities, even in the face of the continuing political
hegemony of an alliance between state officials and
big business. The extent to which these opportuni-
ties can be seized upon and exploited depends on
the mobilization of wider political constituencies in
civil society, both at the national and the global lev-
els. It no longer seems plausible that corruption
will simply die away in the long term as an auto-
matic consequence of some overall systemic trans-
formation, whether this be economic liberalization,
political democratization or social modernization.
Each of these processes may create contexts con-
ducive to controlling corruption, but the role of
human agency is crucial. We can expect that coun-
tries at similar levels of political, social and eco-
nomic maturity may be characterized by varying
levels of corruption (for example, Italy versus the
United Kingdom, Japan versus Germany, Singapore
versus South Korea). This suggests that the task of
combating corruption has its own 'autonomous'
political status. It is likely to require a protracted
battle over political space in which 'clean' areas are
captured and defended and then gradually
expanded to cover more and more social and polit-
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